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# Based on recommendations from:
# http://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project#Recommended_settings
# https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/Hardened/Hardened_Kernel_Project
#
# Dangerous features that can be permanently (for the boot session) disabled at
# boot via sysctl or kernel cmdline are left enabled here, for improved
# flexibility.
#
# See also <nixos/modules/profiles/hardened.nix>
{ stdenv, version }:
with stdenv.lib;
assert (versionAtLeast version "4.9");
''
# Report BUG() conditions and kill the offending process.
BUG y
${optionalString (versionAtLeast version "4.10") ''
BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION y
''}
${optionalString (stdenv.platform.kernelArch == "x86_64") ''
DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR 65536 # Prevent allocation of first 64K of memory
# Reduce attack surface by disabling various emulations
IA32_EMULATION n
X86_X32 n
MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL? n
VMAP_STACK y # Catch kernel stack overflows
# Randomize position of kernel and memory.
RANDOMIZE_BASE y
RANDOMIZE_MEMORY y
# Disable legacy virtual syscalls by default (modern glibc use vDSO instead).
#
# Note that the vanilla default is to *emulate* the legacy vsyscall mechanism,
# which is supposed to be safer than the native variant (wrt. ret2libc), so
# disabling it mainly helps reduce surface.
LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE y
''}
# Safer page access permissions (wrt. code injection). Default on >=4.11.
${optionalString (versionOlder version "4.11") ''
DEBUG_RODATA y
DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX y
''}
# Mark LSM hooks read-only after init. Conflicts with SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
# (disabling SELinux at runtime); hence, SELinux can only be disabled at boot
# via the selinux=0 boot parameter.
${optionalString (versionAtLeast version "4.12") ''
SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE n
SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS n
''}
DEBUG_WX y # boot-time warning on RWX mappings
# Stricter /dev/mem
STRICT_DEVMEM? y
IO_STRICT_DEVMEM? y
# Perform additional validation of commonly targeted structures.
DEBUG_CREDENTIALS y
DEBUG_NOTIFIERS y
DEBUG_LIST y
DEBUG_PI_LIST y # doesn't BUG()
DEBUG_SG y
SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK y
${optionalString (versionAtLeast version "4.13") ''
REFCOUNT_FULL y
''}
# Perform usercopy bounds checking.
HARDENED_USERCOPY y
${optionalString (versionAtLeast version "4.16") ''
HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK n
''}
# Randomize allocator freelists.
SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM y
${optionalString (versionAtLeast version "4.14") ''
SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED y
''}
# Wipe higher-level memory allocations on free() with page_poison=1
PAGE_POISONING y
PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY y
PAGE_POISONING_ZERO y
# Reboot devices immediately if kernel experiences an Oops.
PANIC_ON_OOPS y
PANIC_TIMEOUT -1
GCC_PLUGINS y # Enable gcc plugin options
# Gather additional entropy at boot time for systems that may not have appropriate entropy sources.
GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY y
${optionalString (versionAtLeast version "4.11") ''
GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK y # A port of the PaX structleak plugin
''}
${optionalString (versionAtLeast version "4.14") ''
GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL y # Also cover structs passed by address
''}
# Disable various dangerous settings
ACPI_CUSTOM_METHOD n # Allows writing directly to physical memory
PROC_KCORE n # Exposes kernel text image layout
INET_DIAG n # Has been used for heap based attacks in the past
# Use -fstack-protector-strong (gcc 4.9+) for best stack canary coverage.
CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR n
CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG y
# Enable compile/run-time buffer overflow detection ala glibc's _FORTIFY_SOURCE
${optionalString (versionAtLeast version "4.13") ''
FORTIFY_SOURCE y
''}
''
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