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authorAndreas Rammhold <andreas@rammhold.de>2019-12-15 21:22:30 +0100
committerAndreas Rammhold <andreas@rammhold.de>2019-12-15 21:25:07 +0100
commitb21b92947e931bd40a5144c686510320fba6c88d (patch)
treea3b412d03ee80b4cb28d8c1c59139781e3040122 /pkgs/tools/admin
parent71cde971c7da86123b897d0e96a2e7bd88010df0 (diff)
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ansible_2_6: 2.6.17 -> 2.6.20
This addresses the following security issues:

  * CVE-2019-14846 - Several Ansible plugins could disclose aws
    credentials in log files. inventory/aws_ec2.py, inventory/aws_rds.py,
    lookup/aws_account_attribute.py, and lookup/aws_secret.py,
    lookup/aws_ssm.py use the boto3 library from the Ansible process. The
    boto3 library logs credentials at log level DEBUG. If Ansible's
    logging was enabled (by setting LOG_PATH to a value) Ansible would set
    the global log level to DEBUG. This was inherited by boto and would
    then log boto credentials to the file specified by LOG_PATH. This did
    not affect aws ansible modules as those are executed in a separate
    process. This has been fixed by switching to log level INFO
  * Convert CLI provided passwords to text initially, to prevent unsafe
    context being lost when converting from bytes->text during post
    processing of PlayContext. This prevents CLI provided passwords from
    being incorrectly templated (CVE-2019-14856)
  * properly hide parameters marked with no_log in suboptions when
    invalid parameters are passed to the module (CVE-2019-14858)
  * resolves CVE-2019-10206, by avoiding templating passwords from
    prompt as it is probable they have special characters.
  * Handle improper variable substitution that was happening in
    safe_eval, it was always meant to just do 'type enforcement' and have
    Jinja2 deal with all variable interpolation. Also see CVE-2019-10156

Changelog: https://github.com/ansible/ansible/blob/9bdb89f740a87bcf760424577ce18a8f68d7a741/changelogs/CHANGELOG-v2.6.rst
Diffstat (limited to 'pkgs/tools/admin')
-rw-r--r--pkgs/tools/admin/ansible/default.nix4
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/pkgs/tools/admin/ansible/default.nix b/pkgs/tools/admin/ansible/default.nix
index a78345916f2..5b724fb0bf9 100644
--- a/pkgs/tools/admin/ansible/default.nix
+++ b/pkgs/tools/admin/ansible/default.nix
@@ -17,11 +17,11 @@
 
   ansible_2_6 = with python3Packages; toPythonApplication (ansible.overridePythonAttrs(old: rec {
     pname = "ansible";
-    version = "2.6.17";
+    version = "2.6.20";
 
     src = fetchurl {
       url = "https://releases.ansible.com/ansible/${pname}-${version}.tar.gz";
-      sha256 = "0ixr3g1nb02xblqyk87bzag8sj8phy37m24xflabfl1k2zfh0313";
+      sha256 = "02ra9q2mifyawn0719y78wrbqzik73aymlzwi90fq71jgyfvkkqn";
     };
   }));
 }