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authorMartin Weinelt <hexa@darmstadt.ccc.de>2021-02-25 20:57:49 +0100
committerMartin Weinelt <hexa@darmstadt.ccc.de>2021-02-25 20:57:49 +0100
commit0dd3c094ee472cd9cd7074045fdd8752ad77eb0d (patch)
tree448e08092ba8120d620c920e1140d4e2c102aca4 /pkgs/os-specific/linux/wpa_supplicant
parentb9a45e769ac857a8cf6f6957f7fae6a77af7859a (diff)
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wpa_supplicant: fix for security advisory 2021-1
A vulnerability was discovered in how wpa_supplicant processes P2P
(Wi-Fi Direct) provision discovery requests. Under a corner case
condition, an invalid Provision Discovery Request frame could end up
reaching a state where the oldest peer entry needs to be removed. With
a suitably constructed invalid frame, this could result in use
(read+write) of freed memory. This can result in an attacker within
radio range of the device running P2P discovery being able to cause
unexpected behavior, including termination of the wpa_supplicant process
and potentially code execution.

https://w1.fi/security/2021-1/
Diffstat (limited to 'pkgs/os-specific/linux/wpa_supplicant')
-rw-r--r--pkgs/os-specific/linux/wpa_supplicant/default.nix5
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/wpa_supplicant/default.nix b/pkgs/os-specific/linux/wpa_supplicant/default.nix
index ee8b26c384d..b6af5525be6 100644
--- a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/wpa_supplicant/default.nix
+++ b/pkgs/os-specific/linux/wpa_supplicant/default.nix
@@ -31,6 +31,11 @@ stdenv.mkDerivation rec {
       url = "https://w1.fi/security/2020-2/0001-P2P-Fix-copying-of-secondary-device-types-for-P2P-gr.patch";
       sha256 = "19f4hx0p547mdx8y8arb3vclwyy4w9c8a6a40ryj7q33730mrmn4";
     })
+    # P2P: Fix a corner case in peer addition based on PD Request (https://w1.fi/security/2021-1/)
+    (fetchurl {
+      url = "https://w1.fi/security/2021-1/0001-P2P-Fix-a-corner-case-in-peer-addition-based-on-PD-R.patch";
+      sha256 = "04cnds7hmbqc44jasabjvrdnh66i5hwvk2h2m5z94pmgbzncyh3z";
+    })
   ];
 
   # TODO: Patch epoll so that the dbus actually responds