nixos/security/wrappers: stop using `.real` files

Before this change it was crucial that nonprivileged users are unable to
create hardlinks to SUID wrappers, lest they be able to provide a
different `.real` file alongside. That was ensured by not providing a
location writable to them in the /run/wrappers tmpfs, (unless
disabled) by the fs.protected_hardlinks=1 sysctl, and by the explicit
own-path check in the wrapper. After this change, ensuring
that property is no longer important, and the check is most likely
redundant.

The simplification of expectations of the wrapper will make it
easier to remove some of the assertions in the wrapper (which currently
cause the wrapper to fail in no_new_privs environments, instead of
executing the target with non-elevated privileges).

Note that wrappers had to be copied (not symlinked) into /run/wrappers
due to the SUID/capability bits, and they couldn't be hard/softlinks of
each other due to those bits potentially differing. Thus, this change
doesn't increase the amount of memory used by /run/wrappers.

This change removes part of the test that is obsoleted by the removal of
`.real` files.

1 files changed, 9 insertions, 23 deletions

diff --git a/nixos/modules/security/wrappers/wrapper.c b/nixos/modules/security/wrappers/wrapper.c
index 17776a97af8..b00ec942320 100644
--- a/nixos/modules/security/wrappers/wrapper.c
+++ b/nixos/modules/security/wrappers/wrapper.c
@@ -17,6 +17,10 @@
 #include <syscall.h>
 #include <byteswap.h>
 
+#ifndef SOURCE_PROG
+#error SOURCE_PROG should be defined via preprocessor commandline
+#endif
+
 // aborts when false, printing the failed expression
 #define ASSERT(expr) ((expr) ? (void) 0 : assert_failure(#expr))
 // aborts when returns non-zero, printing the failed expression and errno
@@ -198,11 +202,10 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) {
     int didnt_sgid = (rgid == egid) && (egid == sgid);
 
 
+    // TODO: Determine if this is still useful, in particular if
+    // make_caps_ambient somehow relies on these properties.
     // Make sure that we are being executed from the right location,
-    // i.e., `safe_wrapper_dir'.  This is to prevent someone from creating
-    // hard link `X' from some other location, along with a false
-    // `X.real' file, to allow arbitrary programs from being executed
-    // with elevated capabilities.
+    // i.e., `safe_wrapper_dir'.
     int len = strlen(wrapper_dir);
     if (len > 0 && '/' == wrapper_dir[len - 1])
       --len;
@@ -230,23 +233,6 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) {
     // And, of course, we shouldn't be writable.
     ASSERT(!(st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP | S_IWOTH)));
 
-    // Read the path of the real (wrapped) program from <self>.real.
-    char real_fn[PATH_MAX + 10];
-    int real_fn_size = snprintf(real_fn, sizeof(real_fn), "%s.real", self_path);
-    ASSERT(real_fn_size < sizeof(real_fn));
-
-    int fd_self = open(real_fn, O_RDONLY);
-    ASSERT(fd_self != -1);
-
-    char source_prog[PATH_MAX];
-    len = read(fd_self, source_prog, PATH_MAX);
-    ASSERT(len != -1);
-    ASSERT(len < sizeof(source_prog));
-    ASSERT(len > 0);
-    source_prog[len] = 0;
-
-    close(fd_self);
-
     // Read the capabilities set on the wrapper and raise them in to
     // the ambient set so the program we're wrapping receives the
     // capabilities too!
@@ -256,10 +242,10 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) {
     }
     free(self_path);
 
-    execve(source_prog, argv, environ);
+    execve(SOURCE_PROG, argv, environ);
     
     fprintf(stderr, "%s: cannot run `%s': %s\n",
-        argv[0], source_prog, strerror(errno));
+        argv[0], SOURCE_PROG, strerror(errno));
 
     return 1;
 }