# Based on recommendations from: # http://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project#Recommended_settings # https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/Hardened/Hardened_Kernel_Project # # Dangerous features that can be permanently (for the boot session) disabled at # boot via sysctl or kernel cmdline are left enabled here, for improved # flexibility. # # See also { stdenv, version }: with stdenv.lib; with import ../../../../lib/kernel.nix { inherit (stdenv) lib; inherit version; }; assert (versionAtLeast version "4.9"); optionalAttrs (stdenv.hostPlatform.platform.kernelArch == "x86_64") { DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR = freeform "65536"; # Prevent allocation of first 64K of memory # Reduce attack surface by disabling various emulations IA32_EMULATION = no; X86_X32 = no; # Note: this config depends on EXPERT y and so will not take effect, hence # it is left "optional" for now. MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL = option no; VMAP_STACK = yes; # Catch kernel stack overflows # Randomize position of kernel and memory. RANDOMIZE_BASE = yes; RANDOMIZE_MEMORY = yes; # Disable legacy virtual syscalls by default (modern glibc use vDSO instead). # # Note that the vanilla default is to *emulate* the legacy vsyscall mechanism, # which is supposed to be safer than the native variant (wrt. ret2libc), so # disabling it mainly helps reduce surface. LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE = yes; } // { # Report BUG() conditions and kill the offending process. BUG = yes; BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION = whenAtLeast "4.10" yes; # Safer page access permissions (wrt. code injection). Default on >=4.11. DEBUG_RODATA = whenOlder "4.11" yes; DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX = whenOlder "4.11" yes; # Mark LSM hooks read-only after init. SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS n # conflicts with SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE y; disabling the latter # implicitly marks LSM hooks read-only after init. # # SELinux can only be disabled at boot via selinux=0 # # We set SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS n primarily for documentation purposes; the # config builder fails to detect that it has indeed been unset. SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE = whenAtLeast "4.12" no; SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS = whenAtLeast "4.12" (option no); DEBUG_WX = yes; # boot-time warning on RWX mappings STRICT_KERNEL_RWX = whenAtLeast "4.11" yes; # Stricter /dev/mem STRICT_DEVMEM = option yes; IO_STRICT_DEVMEM = option yes; # Perform additional validation of commonly targeted structures. DEBUG_CREDENTIALS = yes; DEBUG_NOTIFIERS = yes; DEBUG_LIST = yes; DEBUG_PI_LIST = yes; # doesn't BUG() DEBUG_SG = yes; SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK = yes; REFCOUNT_FULL = whenAtLeast "4.13" yes; # Perform usercopy bounds checking. HARDENED_USERCOPY = yes; HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK = whenAtLeast "4.16" no; # for full whitelist enforcement # Randomize allocator freelists. SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM = yes; SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED = whenAtLeast "4.14" yes; # Randomize page allocator when page_alloc.shuffle=1 SHUFFLE_PAGE_ALLOCATOR = whenAtLeast "5.2" yes; # Allow enabling slub/slab free poisoning with slub_debug=P SLUB_DEBUG = yes; # Wipe higher-level memory allocations on free() with page_poison=1 PAGE_POISONING = yes; PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY = yes; PAGE_POISONING_ZERO = yes; # Enable the SafeSetId LSM SECURITY_SAFESETID = whenAtLeast "5.1" yes; # Reboot devices immediately if kernel experiences an Oops. PANIC_ON_OOPS = yes; PANIC_TIMEOUT = freeform "-1"; GCC_PLUGINS = yes; # Enable gcc plugin options # Gather additional entropy at boot time for systems that may = no;ot have appropriate entropy sources. GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY = yes; GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK = whenAtLeast "4.11" yes; # A port of the PaX structleak plugin GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL = whenAtLeast "4.14" yes; # Also cover structs passed by address GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK = whenAtLeast "4.20" yes; # A port of the PaX stackleak plugin GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT = whenAtLeast "4.13" yes; # A port of the PaX randstruct plugin GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE = whenAtLeast "4.13" yes; # Disable various dangerous settings ACPI_CUSTOM_METHOD = no; # Allows writing directly to physical memory PROC_KCORE = no; # Exposes kernel text image layout INET_DIAG = no; # Has been used for heap based attacks in the past # Use -fstack-protector-strong (gcc 4.9+) for best stack canary coverage. CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR = whenOlder "4.18" no; CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG = whenOlder "4.18" yes; # Enable compile/run-time buffer overflow detection ala glibc's _FORTIFY_SOURCE FORTIFY_SOURCE = whenAtLeast "4.13" yes; }