Remove no longer (or never) referenced patches

55 files changed, 6041 deletions. Tested with `nix-build -A tarball`.

10 files changed, 0 insertions, 3009 deletions

diff --git a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel-headers/unifdef-getline.patch b/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel-headers/unifdef-getline.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8caabfd3286..00000000000
--- a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel-headers/unifdef-getline.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-This patch fixes a trivial compilation error with glibc 2.11.
-From http://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11166/ .
-
-diff --git a/scripts/unifdef.c b/scripts/unifdef.c
-index 552025e..977e682 100644
---- a/scripts/unifdef.c
-+++ b/scripts/unifdef.c
-@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@  static void             done(void);
- static void             error(const char *);
- static int              findsym(const char *);
- static void             flushline(bool);
--static Linetype         getline(void);
-+static Linetype         parseline(void);
- static Linetype         ifeval(const char **);
- static void             ignoreoff(void);
- static void             ignoreon(void);
-@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@  process(void)
- 
- 	for (;;) {
- 		linenum++;
--		lineval = getline();
-+		lineval = parseline();
- 		trans_table[ifstate[depth]][lineval]();
- 		debug("process %s -> %s depth %d",
- 		    linetype_name[lineval],
-@@ -526,7 +526,7 @@  process(void)
-  * help from skipcomment().
-  */
- static Linetype
--getline(void)
-+parseline(void)
- {
- 	const char *cp;
- 	int cursym;
-
diff --git a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/apparmor-patches/3.2/0001-AppArmor-compatibility-patch-for-v5-network-controll.patch b/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/apparmor-patches/3.2/0001-AppArmor-compatibility-patch-for-v5-network-controll.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index b411f43298c..00000000000
--- a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/apparmor-patches/3.2/0001-AppArmor-compatibility-patch-for-v5-network-controll.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,553 +0,0 @@
-From 125fccb600288968aa3395883c0a394c47176fcd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
-Date: Wed, 10 Aug 2011 22:02:39 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH 1/3] AppArmor: compatibility patch for v5 network controll
-
-Add compatibility for v5 network rules.
-
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
----
- include/linux/lsm_audit.h          |    4 +
- security/apparmor/Makefile         |   19 +++-
- security/apparmor/include/net.h    |   40 +++++++++
- security/apparmor/include/policy.h |    3 +
- security/apparmor/lsm.c            |  112 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
- security/apparmor/net.c            |  170 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- security/apparmor/policy.c         |    1 +
- security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c  |   48 +++++++++-
- 8 files changed, 394 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
- create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/net.h
- create mode 100644 security/apparmor/net.c
-
-diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
-index 88e78de..c63979a 100644
---- a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
-+++ b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
-@@ -124,6 +124,10 @@ struct common_audit_data {
- 					u32 denied;
- 					uid_t ouid;
- 				} fs;
-+				struct {
-+					int type, protocol;
-+					struct sock *sk;
-+				} net;
- 			};
- 		} apparmor_audit_data;
- #endif
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
-index 2dafe50..7cefef9 100644
---- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
-+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
-@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
- 
- apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
-               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
--              resource.o sid.o file.o
-+              resource.o sid.o file.o net.o
- 
--clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h
-+clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h af_names.h
- 
- 
- # Build a lower case string table of capability names
-@@ -44,9 +44,24 @@ cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *rlim_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
- 	sed -r -n "s/^\# ?define[ \t]+(RLIMIT_[A-Z0-9_]+).*/\1,/p" $< >> $@ ;\
- 	echo "};" >> $@
- 
-+# Build a lower case string table of address family names.
-+# Transform lines from
-+# #define AF_INET		2	/* Internet IP Protocol 	*/
-+# to
-+# [2] = "inet",
-+quiet_cmd_make-af = GEN     $@
-+cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
-+	sed $< >> $@ -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e \
-+	  's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+).*/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
-+	echo "};" >> $@
-+
-+
- $(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
- $(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
-+$(obj)/net.o : $(obj)/af_names.h
- $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h
- 	$(call cmd,make-caps)
- $(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/asm-generic/resource.h
- 	$(call cmd,make-rlim)
-+$(obj)/af_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h
-+	$(call cmd,make-af)
-\ No newline at end of file
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..3c7d599
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
-@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation definitions.
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef __AA_NET_H
-+#define __AA_NET_H
-+
-+#include <net/sock.h>
-+
-+/* struct aa_net - network confinement data
-+ * @allowed: basic network families permissions
-+ * @audit_network: which network permissions to force audit
-+ * @quiet_network: which network permissions to quiet rejects
-+ */
-+struct aa_net {
-+	u16 allow[AF_MAX];
-+	u16 audit[AF_MAX];
-+	u16 quiet[AF_MAX];
-+};
-+
-+extern int aa_net_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family,
-+		       int type, int protocol, struct sock *sk);
-+extern int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk);
-+
-+static inline void aa_free_net_rules(struct aa_net *new)
-+{
-+	/* NOP */
-+}
-+
-+#endif /* __AA_NET_H */
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
-index aeda5cf..6776929 100644
---- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
-+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
-@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
- #include "capability.h"
- #include "domain.h"
- #include "file.h"
-+#include "net.h"
- #include "resource.h"
- 
- extern const char *profile_mode_names[];
-@@ -145,6 +146,7 @@ struct aa_namespace {
-  * @size: the memory consumed by this profiles rules
-  * @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions
-  * @caps: capabilities for the profile
-+ * @net: network controls for the profile
-  * @rlimits: rlimits for the profile
-  *
-  * The AppArmor profile contains the basic confinement data.  Each profile
-@@ -181,6 +183,7 @@ struct aa_profile {
- 
- 	struct aa_file_rules file;
- 	struct aa_caps caps;
-+	struct aa_net net;
- 	struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
- };
- 
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
-index 3783202..7459547 100644
---- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
-@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
- #include "include/context.h"
- #include "include/file.h"
- #include "include/ipc.h"
-+#include "include/net.h"
- #include "include/path.h"
- #include "include/policy.h"
- #include "include/procattr.h"
-@@ -621,6 +622,104 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
- 	return error;
- }
- 
-+static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
-+{
-+	struct aa_profile *profile;
-+	int error = 0;
-+
-+	if (kern)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	profile = __aa_current_profile();
-+	if (!unconfined(profile))
-+		error = aa_net_perm(OP_CREATE, profile, family, type, protocol,
-+				    NULL);
-+	return error;
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
-+				struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_BIND, sk);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
-+				   struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_CONNECT, sk);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_LISTEN, sk);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_ACCEPT, sk);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
-+				   struct msghdr *msg, int size)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SENDMSG, sk);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
-+				   struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_RECVMSG, sk);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKNAME, sk);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETPEERNAME, sk);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
-+				      int optname)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKOPT, sk);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
-+				      int optname)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SETSOCKOPT, sk);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SOCK_SHUTDOWN, sk);
-+}
-+
- static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
- 	.name =				"apparmor",
- 
-@@ -652,6 +751,19 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
- 	.getprocattr =			apparmor_getprocattr,
- 	.setprocattr =			apparmor_setprocattr,
- 
-+	.socket_create =		apparmor_socket_create,
-+	.socket_bind =			apparmor_socket_bind,
-+	.socket_connect =		apparmor_socket_connect,
-+	.socket_listen =		apparmor_socket_listen,
-+	.socket_accept =		apparmor_socket_accept,
-+	.socket_sendmsg =		apparmor_socket_sendmsg,
-+	.socket_recvmsg =		apparmor_socket_recvmsg,
-+	.socket_getsockname =		apparmor_socket_getsockname,
-+	.socket_getpeername =		apparmor_socket_getpeername,
-+	.socket_getsockopt =		apparmor_socket_getsockopt,
-+	.socket_setsockopt =		apparmor_socket_setsockopt,
-+	.socket_shutdown =		apparmor_socket_shutdown,
-+
- 	.cred_alloc_blank =		apparmor_cred_alloc_blank,
- 	.cred_free =			apparmor_cred_free,
- 	.cred_prepare =			apparmor_cred_prepare,
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..1765901
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ */
-+
-+#include "include/apparmor.h"
-+#include "include/audit.h"
-+#include "include/context.h"
-+#include "include/net.h"
-+#include "include/policy.h"
-+
-+#include "af_names.h"
-+
-+static const char *sock_type_names[] = {
-+	"unknown(0)",
-+	"stream",
-+	"dgram",
-+	"raw",
-+	"rdm",
-+	"seqpacket",
-+	"dccp",
-+	"unknown(7)",
-+	"unknown(8)",
-+	"unknown(9)",
-+	"packet",
-+};
-+
-+/* audit callback for net specific fields */
-+static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
-+{
-+	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
-+
-+	audit_log_format(ab, " family=");
-+	if (address_family_names[sa->u.net.family]) {
-+		audit_log_string(ab, address_family_names[sa->u.net.family]);
-+	} else {
-+		audit_log_format(ab, " \"unknown(%d)\"", sa->u.net.family);
-+	}
-+
-+	audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=");
-+	if (sock_type_names[sa->aad.net.type]) {
-+		audit_log_string(ab, sock_type_names[sa->aad.net.type]);
-+	} else {
-+		audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->aad.net.type);
-+	}
-+
-+	audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", sa->aad.net.protocol);
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * audit_net - audit network access
-+ * @profile: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
-+ * @op: operation being checked
-+ * @family: network family
-+ * @type:   network type
-+ * @protocol: network protocol
-+ * @sk: socket auditing is being applied to
-+ * @error: error code for failure else 0
-+ *
-+ * Returns: %0 or sa->error else other errorcode on failure
-+ */
-+static int audit_net(struct aa_profile *profile, int op, u16 family, int type,
-+		     int protocol, struct sock *sk, int error)
-+{
-+	int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
-+	struct common_audit_data sa;
-+	if (sk) {
-+		COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NET);
-+	} else {
-+		COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
-+	}
-+	/* todo fill in socket addr info */
-+
-+	sa.aad.op = op,
-+	sa.u.net.family = family;
-+	sa.u.net.sk = sk;
-+	sa.aad.net.type = type;
-+	sa.aad.net.protocol = protocol;
-+	sa.aad.error = error;
-+
-+	if (likely(!sa.aad.error)) {
-+		u16 audit_mask = profile->net.audit[sa.u.net.family];
-+		if (likely((AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) &&
-+			   !(1 << sa.aad.net.type & audit_mask)))
-+			return 0;
-+		audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
-+	} else {
-+		u16 quiet_mask = profile->net.quiet[sa.u.net.family];
-+		u16 kill_mask = 0;
-+		u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad.net.type) & ~quiet_mask;
-+
-+		if (denied & kill_mask)
-+			audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
-+
-+		if ((denied & quiet_mask) &&
-+		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
-+		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
-+			return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : sa.aad.error;
-+	}
-+
-+	return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, GFP_KERNEL, &sa, audit_cb);
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_net_perm - very course network access check
-+ * @op: operation being checked
-+ * @profile: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
-+ * @family: network family
-+ * @type:   network type
-+ * @protocol: network protocol
-+ *
-+ * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
-+ */
-+int aa_net_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family, int type,
-+		int protocol, struct sock *sk)
-+{
-+	u16 family_mask;
-+	int error;
-+
-+	if ((family < 0) || (family >= AF_MAX))
-+		return -EINVAL;
-+
-+	if ((type < 0) || (type >= SOCK_MAX))
-+		return -EINVAL;
-+
-+	/* unix domain and netlink sockets are handled by ipc */
-+	if (family == AF_UNIX || family == AF_NETLINK)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	family_mask = profile->net.allow[family];
-+
-+	error = (family_mask & (1 << type)) ? 0 : -EACCES;
-+
-+	return audit_net(profile, op, family, type, protocol, sk, error);
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_revalidate_sk - Revalidate access to a sock
-+ * @op: operation being checked
-+ * @sk: sock being revalidated  (NOT NULL)
-+ *
-+ * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
-+ */
-+int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk)
-+{
-+	struct aa_profile *profile;
-+	int error = 0;
-+
-+	/* aa_revalidate_sk should not be called from interrupt context
-+	 * don't mediate these calls as they are not task related
-+	 */
-+	if (in_interrupt())
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	profile = __aa_current_profile();
-+	if (!unconfined(profile))
-+		error = aa_net_perm(op, profile, sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
-+				    sk->sk_protocol, sk);
-+
-+	return error;
-+}
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
-index 4f0eade..4d5ce13 100644
---- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
-@@ -745,6 +745,7 @@ static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
- 
- 	aa_free_file_rules(&profile->file);
- 	aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps);
-+	aa_free_net_rules(&profile->net);
- 	aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits);
- 
- 	aa_free_sid(profile->sid);
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
-index 741dd13..ee8043e 100644
---- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
-@@ -190,6 +190,19 @@ fail:
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-+static bool unpack_u16(struct aa_ext *e, u16 *data, const char *name)
-+{
-+	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U16, name)) {
-+		if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u16)))
-+			return 0;
-+		if (data)
-+			*data = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u16 *) e->pos));
-+		e->pos += sizeof(u16);
-+		return 1;
-+	}
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
- static bool unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name)
- {
- 	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U32, name)) {
-@@ -468,7 +481,8 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
- {
- 	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
- 	const char *name = NULL;
--	int error = -EPROTO;
-+	size_t size = 0;
-+	int i, error = -EPROTO;
- 	kernel_cap_t tmpcap;
- 	u32 tmp;
- 
-@@ -559,6 +573,38 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
- 	if (!unpack_rlimits(e, profile))
- 		goto fail;
- 
-+	size = unpack_array(e, "net_allowed_af");
-+	if (size) {
-+
-+		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
-+			/* discard extraneous rules that this kernel will
-+			 * never request
-+			 */
-+			if (i >= AF_MAX) {
-+				u16 tmp;
-+				if (!unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
-+				    !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
-+				    !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL))
-+					goto fail;
-+				continue;
-+			}
-+			if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.allow[i], NULL))
-+				goto fail;
-+			if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.audit[i], NULL))
-+				goto fail;
-+			if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.quiet[i], NULL))
-+				goto fail;
-+		}
-+		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
-+			goto fail;
-+		/*
-+		 * allow unix domain and netlink sockets they are handled
-+		 * by IPC
-+		 */
-+	}
-+	profile->net.allow[AF_UNIX] = 0xffff;
-+	profile->net.allow[AF_NETLINK] = 0xffff;
-+
- 	/* get file rules */
- 	profile->file.dfa = unpack_dfa(e);
- 	if (IS_ERR(profile->file.dfa)) {
--- 
-1.7.9.5
-
diff --git a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/apparmor-patches/3.2/0002-AppArmor-compatibility-patch-for-v5-interface.patch b/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/apparmor-patches/3.2/0002-AppArmor-compatibility-patch-for-v5-interface.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index aa4b6b1109f..00000000000
--- a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/apparmor-patches/3.2/0002-AppArmor-compatibility-patch-for-v5-interface.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,391 +0,0 @@
-From 004192fb5223c7b81a949e36a080a5da56132826 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
-Date: Wed, 10 Aug 2011 22:02:40 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH 2/3] AppArmor: compatibility patch for v5 interface
-
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
----
- security/apparmor/Kconfig              |    9 +
- security/apparmor/Makefile             |    1 +
- security/apparmor/apparmorfs-24.c      |  287 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c         |   18 +-
- security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h |    6 +
- 5 files changed, 319 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
- create mode 100644 security/apparmor/apparmorfs-24.c
-
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/Kconfig b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
-index 9b9013b..51ebf96 100644
---- a/security/apparmor/Kconfig
-+++ b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
-@@ -29,3 +29,12 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
- 	  boot.
- 
- 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1.
-+
-+config SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24
-+	bool "Enable AppArmor 2.4 compatability"
-+	depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR
-+	default y
-+	help
-+	  This option enables compatability with AppArmor 2.4.  It is
-+          recommended if compatability with older versions of AppArmor
-+          is desired.
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
-index 7cefef9..0bb604b 100644
---- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
-+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
-@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
- apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
-               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
-               resource.o sid.o file.o net.o
-+apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24) += apparmorfs-24.o
- 
- clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h af_names.h
- 
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs-24.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs-24.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..dc8c744
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs-24.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor /sys/kernel/secrutiy/apparmor interface functions
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ *
-+ *
-+ * This file contain functions providing an interface for <= AppArmor 2.4
-+ * compatibility.  It is dependent on CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24
-+ * being set (see Makefile).
-+ */
-+
-+#include <linux/security.h>
-+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
-+#include <linux/module.h>
-+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
-+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
-+#include <linux/namei.h>
-+
-+#include "include/apparmor.h"
-+#include "include/audit.h"
-+#include "include/context.h"
-+#include "include/policy.h"
-+
-+
-+/* apparmor/matching */
-+static ssize_t aa_matching_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
-+				size_t size, loff_t *ppos)
-+{
-+	const char matching[] = "pattern=aadfa audit perms=crwxamlk/ "
-+	    "user::other";
-+
-+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, size, ppos, matching,
-+				       sizeof(matching) - 1);
-+}
-+
-+const struct file_operations aa_fs_matching_fops = {
-+	.read = aa_matching_read,
-+};
-+
-+/* apparmor/features */
-+static ssize_t aa_features_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
-+				size_t size, loff_t *ppos)
-+{
-+	const char features[] = "file=3.1 capability=2.0 network=1.0 "
-+	    "change_hat=1.5 change_profile=1.1 " "aanamespaces=1.1 rlimit=1.1";
-+
-+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, size, ppos, features,
-+				       sizeof(features) - 1);
-+}
-+
-+const struct file_operations aa_fs_features_fops = {
-+	.read = aa_features_read,
-+};
-+
-+/**
-+ * __next_namespace - find the next namespace to list
-+ * @root: root namespace to stop search at (NOT NULL)
-+ * @ns: current ns position (NOT NULL)
-+ *
-+ * Find the next namespace from @ns under @root and handle all locking needed
-+ * while switching current namespace.
-+ *
-+ * Returns: next namespace or NULL if at last namespace under @root
-+ * NOTE: will not unlock root->lock
-+ */
-+static struct aa_namespace *__next_namespace(struct aa_namespace *root,
-+					     struct aa_namespace *ns)
-+{
-+	struct aa_namespace *parent;
-+
-+	/* is next namespace a child */
-+	if (!list_empty(&ns->sub_ns)) {
-+		struct aa_namespace *next;
-+		next = list_first_entry(&ns->sub_ns, typeof(*ns), base.list);
-+		read_lock(&next->lock);
-+		return next;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* check if the next ns is a sibling, parent, gp, .. */
-+	parent = ns->parent;
-+	while (parent) {
-+		read_unlock(&ns->lock);
-+		list_for_each_entry_continue(ns, &parent->sub_ns, base.list) {
-+			read_lock(&ns->lock);
-+			return ns;
-+		}
-+		if (parent == root)
-+			return NULL;
-+		ns = parent;
-+		parent = parent->parent;
-+	}
-+
-+	return NULL;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * __first_profile - find the first profile in a namespace
-+ * @root: namespace that is root of profiles being displayed (NOT NULL)
-+ * @ns: namespace to start in   (NOT NULL)
-+ *
-+ * Returns: unrefcounted profile or NULL if no profile
-+ */
-+static struct aa_profile *__first_profile(struct aa_namespace *root,
-+					  struct aa_namespace *ns)
-+{
-+	for ( ; ns; ns = __next_namespace(root, ns)) {
-+		if (!list_empty(&ns->base.profiles))
-+			return list_first_entry(&ns->base.profiles,
-+						struct aa_profile, base.list);
-+	}
-+	return NULL;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * __next_profile - step to the next profile in a profile tree
-+ * @profile: current profile in tree (NOT NULL)
-+ *
-+ * Perform a depth first taversal on the profile tree in a namespace
-+ *
-+ * Returns: next profile or NULL if done
-+ * Requires: profile->ns.lock to be held
-+ */
-+static struct aa_profile *__next_profile(struct aa_profile *p)
-+{
-+	struct aa_profile *parent;
-+	struct aa_namespace *ns = p->ns;
-+
-+	/* is next profile a child */
-+	if (!list_empty(&p->base.profiles))
-+		return list_first_entry(&p->base.profiles, typeof(*p),
-+					base.list);
-+
-+	/* is next profile a sibling, parent sibling, gp, subling, .. */
-+	parent = p->parent;
-+	while (parent) {
-+		list_for_each_entry_continue(p, &parent->base.profiles,
-+					     base.list)
-+				return p;
-+		p = parent;
-+		parent = parent->parent;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* is next another profile in the namespace */
-+	list_for_each_entry_continue(p, &ns->base.profiles, base.list)
-+		return p;
-+
-+	return NULL;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * next_profile - step to the next profile in where ever it may be
-+ * @root: root namespace  (NOT NULL)
-+ * @profile: current profile  (NOT NULL)
-+ *
-+ * Returns: next profile or NULL if there isn't one
-+ */
-+static struct aa_profile *next_profile(struct aa_namespace *root,
-+				       struct aa_profile *profile)
-+{
-+	struct aa_profile *next = __next_profile(profile);
-+	if (next)
-+		return next;
-+
-+	/* finished all profiles in namespace move to next namespace */
-+	return __first_profile(root, __next_namespace(root, profile->ns));
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * p_start - start a depth first traversal of profile tree
-+ * @f: seq_file to fill
-+ * @pos: current position
-+ *
-+ * Returns: first profile under current namespace or NULL if none found
-+ *
-+ * acquires first ns->lock
-+ */
-+static void *p_start(struct seq_file *f, loff_t *pos)
-+	__acquires(root->lock)
-+{
-+	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
-+	struct aa_namespace *root = aa_current_profile()->ns;
-+	loff_t l = *pos;
-+	f->private = aa_get_namespace(root);
-+
-+
-+	/* find the first profile */
-+	read_lock(&root->lock);
-+	profile = __first_profile(root, root);
-+
-+	/* skip to position */
-+	for (; profile && l > 0; l--)
-+		profile = next_profile(root, profile);
-+
-+	return profile;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * p_next - read the next profile entry
-+ * @f: seq_file to fill
-+ * @p: profile previously returned
-+ * @pos: current position
-+ *
-+ * Returns: next profile after @p or NULL if none
-+ *
-+ * may acquire/release locks in namespace tree as necessary
-+ */
-+static void *p_next(struct seq_file *f, void *p, loff_t *pos)
-+{
-+	struct aa_profile *profile = p;
-+	struct aa_namespace *root = f->private;
-+	(*pos)++;
-+
-+	return next_profile(root, profile);
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * p_stop - stop depth first traversal
-+ * @f: seq_file we are filling
-+ * @p: the last profile writen
-+ *
-+ * Release all locking done by p_start/p_next on namespace tree
-+ */
-+static void p_stop(struct seq_file *f, void *p)
-+	__releases(root->lock)
-+{
-+	struct aa_profile *profile = p;
-+	struct aa_namespace *root = f->private, *ns;
-+
-+	if (profile) {
-+		for (ns = profile->ns; ns && ns != root; ns = ns->parent)
-+			read_unlock(&ns->lock);
-+	}
-+	read_unlock(&root->lock);
-+	aa_put_namespace(root);
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * seq_show_profile - show a profile entry
-+ * @f: seq_file to file
-+ * @p: current position (profile)    (NOT NULL)
-+ *
-+ * Returns: error on failure
-+ */
-+static int seq_show_profile(struct seq_file *f, void *p)
-+{
-+	struct aa_profile *profile = (struct aa_profile *)p;
-+	struct aa_namespace *root = f->private;
-+
-+	if (profile->ns != root)
-+		seq_printf(f, ":%s://", aa_ns_name(root, profile->ns));
-+	seq_printf(f, "%s (%s)\n", profile->base.hname,
-+		   COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? "complain" : "enforce");
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static const struct seq_operations aa_fs_profiles_op = {
-+	.start = p_start,
-+	.next = p_next,
-+	.stop = p_stop,
-+	.show = seq_show_profile,
-+};
-+
-+static int profiles_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
-+{
-+	return seq_open(file, &aa_fs_profiles_op);
-+}
-+
-+static int profiles_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
-+{
-+	return seq_release(inode, file);
-+}
-+
-+const struct file_operations aa_fs_profiles_fops = {
-+	.open = profiles_open,
-+	.read = seq_read,
-+	.llseek = seq_lseek,
-+	.release = profiles_release,
-+};
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
-index 69ddb47..867995c 100644
---- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
-@@ -187,7 +187,11 @@ void __init aa_destroy_aafs(void)
- 		aafs_remove(".remove");
- 		aafs_remove(".replace");
- 		aafs_remove(".load");
--
-+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24
-+		aafs_remove("profiles");
-+		aafs_remove("matching");
-+		aafs_remove("features");
-+#endif
- 		securityfs_remove(aa_fs_dentry);
- 		aa_fs_dentry = NULL;
- 	}
-@@ -218,7 +222,17 @@ static int __init aa_create_aafs(void)
- 		aa_fs_dentry = NULL;
- 		goto error;
- 	}
--
-+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24
-+	error = aafs_create("matching", 0444, &aa_fs_matching_fops);
-+	if (error)
-+		goto error;
-+	error = aafs_create("features", 0444, &aa_fs_features_fops);
-+	if (error)
-+		goto error;
-+#endif
-+	error = aafs_create("profiles", 0440, &aa_fs_profiles_fops);
-+	if (error)
-+		goto error;
- 	error = aafs_create(".load", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_load);
- 	if (error)
- 		goto error;
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h
-index cb1e93a..14f955c 100644
---- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h
-+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h
-@@ -17,4 +17,10 @@
- 
- extern void __init aa_destroy_aafs(void);
- 
-+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24
-+extern const struct file_operations aa_fs_matching_fops;
-+extern const struct file_operations aa_fs_features_fops;
-+extern const struct file_operations aa_fs_profiles_fops;
-+#endif
-+
- #endif /* __AA_APPARMORFS_H */
--- 
-1.7.9.5
-
diff --git a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/apparmor-patches/3.2/0003-AppArmor-Allow-dfa-backward-compatibility-with-broke.patch b/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/apparmor-patches/3.2/0003-AppArmor-Allow-dfa-backward-compatibility-with-broke.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 7dd55781fda..00000000000
--- a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/apparmor-patches/3.2/0003-AppArmor-Allow-dfa-backward-compatibility-with-broke.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
-From e5d90918aa31f948ecec2f3c088567dbab30c90b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
-Date: Wed, 10 Aug 2011 22:02:41 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH 3/3] AppArmor: Allow dfa backward compatibility with broken
- userspace
-
-The apparmor_parser when compiling policy could generate invalid dfas
-that did not have sufficient padding to avoid invalid references, when
-used by the kernel.  The kernels check to verify the next/check table
-size was broken meaning invalid dfas were being created by userspace
-and not caught.
-
-To remain compatible with old tools that are not fixed, pad the loaded
-dfas next/check table.  The dfa's themselves are valid except for the
-high padding for potentially invalid transitions (high bounds error),
-which have a maximimum is 256 entries.  So just allocate an extra null filled
-256 entries for the next/check tables.  This will guarentee all bounds
-are good and invalid transitions go to the null (0) state.
-
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
----
- security/apparmor/match.c |   17 +++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c
-index 94de6b4..081491e 100644
---- a/security/apparmor/match.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
-@@ -57,8 +57,17 @@ static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize)
- 	if (bsize < tsize)
- 		goto out;
- 
-+	/* Pad table allocation for next/check by 256 entries to remain
-+	 * backwards compatible with old (buggy) tools and remain safe without
-+	 * run time checks
-+	 */
-+	if (th.td_id == YYTD_ID_NXT || th.td_id == YYTD_ID_CHK)
-+		tsize += 256 * th.td_flags;
-+
- 	table = kvmalloc(tsize);
- 	if (table) {
-+		/* ensure the pad is clear, else there will be errors */
-+		memset(table, 0, tsize);
- 		*table = th;
- 		if (th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA8)
- 			UNPACK_ARRAY(table->td_data, blob, th.td_lolen,
-@@ -134,11 +143,19 @@ static int verify_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa, int flags)
- 		goto out;
- 
- 	if (flags & DFA_FLAG_VERIFY_STATES) {
-+		int warning = 0;
- 		for (i = 0; i < state_count; i++) {
- 			if (DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count)
- 				goto out;
- 			/* TODO: do check that DEF state recursion terminates */
- 			if (BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i] + 255 >= trans_count) {
-+				if (warning)
-+					continue;
-+				printk(KERN_WARNING "AppArmor DFA next/check "
-+				       "upper bounds error fixed, upgrade "
-+				       "user space tools \n");
-+				warning = 1;
-+			} else if (BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= trans_count) {
- 				printk(KERN_ERR "AppArmor DFA next/check upper "
- 				       "bounds error\n");
- 				goto out;
--- 
-1.7.9.5
-
diff --git a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/apparmor-patches/3.4/0001-UBUNTU-SAUCE-AppArmor-Add-profile-introspection-file.patch b/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/apparmor-patches/3.4/0001-UBUNTU-SAUCE-AppArmor-Add-profile-introspection-file.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 88a50ca780a..00000000000
--- a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/apparmor-patches/3.4/0001-UBUNTU-SAUCE-AppArmor-Add-profile-introspection-file.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,264 +0,0 @@
-From 8de755e4dfdbc40bfcaca848ae6b5aeaf0ede0e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
-Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2010 02:32:02 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH 1/3] UBUNTU: SAUCE: AppArmor: Add profile introspection file
- to interface
-
-Add the dynamic profiles file to the interace, to allow load policy
-introspection.
-
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
-Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
-Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
----
- security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c |  227 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 227 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
-index 16c15ec..89bdc62 100644
---- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
-@@ -182,6 +182,232 @@ const struct file_operations aa_fs_seq_file_ops = {
- 	.release	= single_release,
- };
- 
-+/**
-+ * __next_namespace - find the next namespace to list
-+ * @root: root namespace to stop search at (NOT NULL)
-+ * @ns: current ns position (NOT NULL)
-+ *
-+ * Find the next namespace from @ns under @root and handle all locking needed
-+ * while switching current namespace.
-+ *
-+ * Returns: next namespace or NULL if at last namespace under @root
-+ * NOTE: will not unlock root->lock
-+ */
-+static struct aa_namespace *__next_namespace(struct aa_namespace *root,
-+					     struct aa_namespace *ns)
-+{
-+	struct aa_namespace *parent;
-+
-+	/* is next namespace a child */
-+	if (!list_empty(&ns->sub_ns)) {
-+		struct aa_namespace *next;
-+		next = list_first_entry(&ns->sub_ns, typeof(*ns), base.list);
-+		read_lock(&next->lock);
-+		return next;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* check if the next ns is a sibling, parent, gp, .. */
-+	parent = ns->parent;
-+	while (parent) {
-+		read_unlock(&ns->lock);
-+		list_for_each_entry_continue(ns, &parent->sub_ns, base.list) {
-+			read_lock(&ns->lock);
-+			return ns;
-+		}
-+		if (parent == root)
-+			return NULL;
-+		ns = parent;
-+		parent = parent->parent;
-+	}
-+
-+	return NULL;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * __first_profile - find the first profile in a namespace
-+ * @root: namespace that is root of profiles being displayed (NOT NULL)
-+ * @ns: namespace to start in   (NOT NULL)
-+ *
-+ * Returns: unrefcounted profile or NULL if no profile
-+ */
-+static struct aa_profile *__first_profile(struct aa_namespace *root,
-+					  struct aa_namespace *ns)
-+{
-+	for ( ; ns; ns = __next_namespace(root, ns)) {
-+		if (!list_empty(&ns->base.profiles))
-+			return list_first_entry(&ns->base.profiles,
-+						struct aa_profile, base.list);
-+	}
-+	return NULL;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * __next_profile - step to the next profile in a profile tree
-+ * @profile: current profile in tree (NOT NULL)
-+ *
-+ * Perform a depth first taversal on the profile tree in a namespace
-+ *
-+ * Returns: next profile or NULL if done
-+ * Requires: profile->ns.lock to be held
-+ */
-+static struct aa_profile *__next_profile(struct aa_profile *p)
-+{
-+	struct aa_profile *parent;
-+	struct aa_namespace *ns = p->ns;
-+
-+	/* is next profile a child */
-+	if (!list_empty(&p->base.profiles))
-+		return list_first_entry(&p->base.profiles, typeof(*p),
-+					base.list);
-+
-+	/* is next profile a sibling, parent sibling, gp, subling, .. */
-+	parent = p->parent;
-+	while (parent) {
-+		list_for_each_entry_continue(p, &parent->base.profiles,
-+					     base.list)
-+				return p;
-+		p = parent;
-+		parent = parent->parent;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* is next another profile in the namespace */
-+	list_for_each_entry_continue(p, &ns->base.profiles, base.list)
-+		return p;
-+
-+	return NULL;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * next_profile - step to the next profile in where ever it may be
-+ * @root: root namespace  (NOT NULL)
-+ * @profile: current profile  (NOT NULL)
-+ *
-+ * Returns: next profile or NULL if there isn't one
-+ */
-+static struct aa_profile *next_profile(struct aa_namespace *root,
-+				       struct aa_profile *profile)
-+{
-+	struct aa_profile *next = __next_profile(profile);
-+	if (next)
-+		return next;
-+
-+	/* finished all profiles in namespace move to next namespace */
-+	return __first_profile(root, __next_namespace(root, profile->ns));
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * p_start - start a depth first traversal of profile tree
-+ * @f: seq_file to fill
-+ * @pos: current position
-+ *
-+ * Returns: first profile under current namespace or NULL if none found
-+ *
-+ * acquires first ns->lock
-+ */
-+static void *p_start(struct seq_file *f, loff_t *pos)
-+	__acquires(root->lock)
-+{
-+	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
-+	struct aa_namespace *root = aa_current_profile()->ns;
-+	loff_t l = *pos;
-+	f->private = aa_get_namespace(root);
-+
-+
-+	/* find the first profile */
-+	read_lock(&root->lock);
-+	profile = __first_profile(root, root);
-+
-+	/* skip to position */
-+	for (; profile && l > 0; l--)
-+		profile = next_profile(root, profile);
-+
-+	return profile;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * p_next - read the next profile entry
-+ * @f: seq_file to fill
-+ * @p: profile previously returned
-+ * @pos: current position
-+ *
-+ * Returns: next profile after @p or NULL if none
-+ *
-+ * may acquire/release locks in namespace tree as necessary
-+ */
-+static void *p_next(struct seq_file *f, void *p, loff_t *pos)
-+{
-+	struct aa_profile *profile = p;
-+	struct aa_namespace *root = f->private;
-+	(*pos)++;
-+
-+	return next_profile(root, profile);
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * p_stop - stop depth first traversal
-+ * @f: seq_file we are filling
-+ * @p: the last profile writen
-+ *
-+ * Release all locking done by p_start/p_next on namespace tree
-+ */
-+static void p_stop(struct seq_file *f, void *p)
-+	__releases(root->lock)
-+{
-+	struct aa_profile *profile = p;
-+	struct aa_namespace *root = f->private, *ns;
-+
-+	if (profile) {
-+		for (ns = profile->ns; ns && ns != root; ns = ns->parent)
-+			read_unlock(&ns->lock);
-+	}
-+	read_unlock(&root->lock);
-+	aa_put_namespace(root);
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * seq_show_profile - show a profile entry
-+ * @f: seq_file to file
-+ * @p: current position (profile)    (NOT NULL)
-+ *
-+ * Returns: error on failure
-+ */
-+static int seq_show_profile(struct seq_file *f, void *p)
-+{
-+	struct aa_profile *profile = (struct aa_profile *)p;
-+	struct aa_namespace *root = f->private;
-+
-+	if (profile->ns != root)
-+		seq_printf(f, ":%s://", aa_ns_name(root, profile->ns));
-+	seq_printf(f, "%s (%s)\n", profile->base.hname,
-+		   COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? "complain" : "enforce");
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static const struct seq_operations aa_fs_profiles_op = {
-+	.start = p_start,
-+	.next = p_next,
-+	.stop = p_stop,
-+	.show = seq_show_profile,
-+};
-+
-+static int profiles_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
-+{
-+	return seq_open(file, &aa_fs_profiles_op);
-+}
-+
-+static int profiles_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
-+{
-+	return seq_release(inode, file);
-+}
-+
-+const struct file_operations aa_fs_profiles_fops = {
-+	.open = profiles_open,
-+	.read = seq_read,
-+	.llseek = seq_lseek,
-+	.release = profiles_release,
-+};
-+
- /** Base file system setup **/
- 
- static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_file[] = {
-@@ -210,6 +436,7 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_apparmor[] = {
- 	AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".load", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_load),
- 	AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".replace", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_replace),
- 	AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".remove", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_remove),
-+	AA_FS_FILE_FOPS("profiles", 0640, &aa_fs_profiles_fops),
- 	AA_FS_DIR("features", aa_fs_entry_features),
- 	{ }
- };
--- 
-1.7.9.5
-
diff --git a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/apparmor-patches/3.4/0002-UBUNTU-SAUCE-AppArmor-basic-networking-rules.patch b/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/apparmor-patches/3.4/0002-UBUNTU-SAUCE-AppArmor-basic-networking-rules.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 01316b9db78..00000000000
--- a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/apparmor-patches/3.4/0002-UBUNTU-SAUCE-AppArmor-basic-networking-rules.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,603 +0,0 @@
-From 423e2cb454d75d6185eecd0c1b5cf6ccc2d8482d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
-Date: Mon, 4 Oct 2010 15:03:36 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH 2/3] UBUNTU: SAUCE: AppArmor: basic networking rules
-
-Base support for network mediation.
-
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
----
- security/apparmor/.gitignore       |    2 +-
- security/apparmor/Makefile         |   42 +++++++++-
- security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c     |    1 +
- security/apparmor/include/audit.h  |    4 +
- security/apparmor/include/net.h    |   44 ++++++++++
- security/apparmor/include/policy.h |    3 +
- security/apparmor/lsm.c            |  112 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
- security/apparmor/net.c            |  162 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- security/apparmor/policy.c         |    1 +
- security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c  |   46 ++++++++++
- 10 files changed, 414 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
- create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/net.h
- create mode 100644 security/apparmor/net.c
-
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/.gitignore b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
-index 4d995ae..d5b291e 100644
---- a/security/apparmor/.gitignore
-+++ b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
-@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
- #
- # Generated include files
- #
--af_names.h
-+net_names.h
- capability_names.h
- rlim_names.h
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
-index 806bd19..19daa85 100644
---- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
-+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
-@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
- 
- apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
-               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
--              resource.o sid.o file.o
-+              resource.o sid.o file.o net.o
- 
--clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h
-+clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
- 
- 
- # Build a lower case string table of capability names
-@@ -20,6 +20,38 @@ cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *const capability_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
- 	-e 's/^\#define[ \t]+CAP_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
- 	echo "};" >> $@
- 
-+# Build a lower case string table of address family names
-+# Transform lines from
-+#    define AF_LOCAL	1	/* POSIX name for AF_UNIX	*/
-+#    #define AF_INET		2	/* Internet IP Protocol 	*/
-+# to
-+#    [1] = "local",
-+#    [2] = "inet",
-+#
-+# and build the securityfs entries for the mapping.
-+# Transforms lines from
-+#    #define AF_INET		2	/* Internet IP Protocol 	*/
-+# to
-+#    #define AA_FS_AF_MASK "local inet"
-+quiet_cmd_make-af = GEN     $@
-+cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
-+	sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e \
-+	 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
-+	echo "};" >> $@ ;\
-+	echo -n '\#define AA_FS_AF_MASK "' >> $@ ;\
-+	sed -r -n 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/\L\1/p'\
-+	 $< | tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
-+
-+# Build a lower case string table of sock type names
-+# Transform lines from
-+#    SOCK_STREAM	= 1,
-+# to
-+#    [1] = "stream",
-+quiet_cmd_make-sock = GEN     $@
-+cmd_make-sock = echo "static const char *sock_type_names[] = {" >> $@ ;\
-+	sed $^ >>$@ -r -n \
-+	-e 's/^\tSOCK_([A-Z0-9_]+)[\t]+=[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
-+	echo "};" >> $@
- 
- # Build a lower case string table of rlimit names.
- # Transforms lines from
-@@ -56,6 +88,7 @@ cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \
- 	    tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
- 
- $(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
-+$(obj)/net.o : $(obj)/net_names.h
- $(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
- $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h \
- 			    $(src)/Makefile
-@@ -63,3 +96,8 @@ $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h \
- $(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/asm-generic/resource.h \
- 		      $(src)/Makefile
- 	$(call cmd,make-rlim)
-+$(obj)/net_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h \
-+		     $(srctree)/include/linux/net.h \
-+		     $(src)/Makefile
-+	$(call cmd,make-af)
-+	$(call cmd,make-sock)
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
-index 89bdc62..c66315d 100644
---- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
-@@ -427,6 +427,7 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_domain[] = {
- static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
- 	AA_FS_DIR("domain",			aa_fs_entry_domain),
- 	AA_FS_DIR("file",			aa_fs_entry_file),
-+	AA_FS_DIR("network",                    aa_fs_entry_network),
- 	AA_FS_FILE_U64("capability",		VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
- 	AA_FS_DIR("rlimit",			aa_fs_entry_rlimit),
- 	{ }
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
-index 3868b1e..c1ff09c 100644
---- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
-+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
-@@ -126,6 +126,10 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
- 			u32 denied;
- 			uid_t ouid;
- 		} fs;
-+		struct {
-+			int type, protocol;
-+			struct sock *sk;
-+		} net;
- 	};
- };
- 
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..cb8a121
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
-@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation definitions.
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef __AA_NET_H
-+#define __AA_NET_H
-+
-+#include <net/sock.h>
-+
-+#include "apparmorfs.h"
-+
-+/* struct aa_net - network confinement data
-+ * @allowed: basic network families permissions
-+ * @audit_network: which network permissions to force audit
-+ * @quiet_network: which network permissions to quiet rejects
-+ */
-+struct aa_net {
-+	u16 allow[AF_MAX];
-+	u16 audit[AF_MAX];
-+	u16 quiet[AF_MAX];
-+};
-+
-+extern struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_network[];
-+
-+extern int aa_net_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family,
-+		       int type, int protocol, struct sock *sk);
-+extern int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk);
-+
-+static inline void aa_free_net_rules(struct aa_net *new)
-+{
-+	/* NOP */
-+}
-+
-+#endif /* __AA_NET_H */
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
-index bda4569..eb13a73 100644
---- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
-+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
-@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
- #include "capability.h"
- #include "domain.h"
- #include "file.h"
-+#include "net.h"
- #include "resource.h"
- 
- extern const char *const profile_mode_names[];
-@@ -157,6 +158,7 @@ struct aa_policydb {
-  * @policy: general match rules governing policy
-  * @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions
-  * @caps: capabilities for the profile
-+ * @net: network controls for the profile
-  * @rlimits: rlimits for the profile
-  *
-  * The AppArmor profile contains the basic confinement data.  Each profile
-@@ -194,6 +196,7 @@ struct aa_profile {
- 	struct aa_policydb policy;
- 	struct aa_file_rules file;
- 	struct aa_caps caps;
-+	struct aa_net net;
- 	struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
- };
- 
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
-index ad05d39..3cde194 100644
---- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
-@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
- #include "include/context.h"
- #include "include/file.h"
- #include "include/ipc.h"
-+#include "include/net.h"
- #include "include/path.h"
- #include "include/policy.h"
- #include "include/procattr.h"
-@@ -622,6 +623,104 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
- 	return error;
- }
- 
-+static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
-+{
-+	struct aa_profile *profile;
-+	int error = 0;
-+
-+	if (kern)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	profile = __aa_current_profile();
-+	if (!unconfined(profile))
-+		error = aa_net_perm(OP_CREATE, profile, family, type, protocol,
-+				    NULL);
-+	return error;
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
-+				struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_BIND, sk);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
-+				   struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_CONNECT, sk);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_LISTEN, sk);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_ACCEPT, sk);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
-+				   struct msghdr *msg, int size)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SENDMSG, sk);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
-+				   struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_RECVMSG, sk);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKNAME, sk);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETPEERNAME, sk);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
-+				      int optname)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKOPT, sk);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
-+				      int optname)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SETSOCKOPT, sk);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
-+{
-+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SOCK_SHUTDOWN, sk);
-+}
-+
- static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
- 	.name =				"apparmor",
- 
-@@ -653,6 +752,19 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
- 	.getprocattr =			apparmor_getprocattr,
- 	.setprocattr =			apparmor_setprocattr,
- 
-+	.socket_create =		apparmor_socket_create,
-+	.socket_bind =			apparmor_socket_bind,
-+	.socket_connect =		apparmor_socket_connect,
-+	.socket_listen =		apparmor_socket_listen,
-+	.socket_accept =		apparmor_socket_accept,
-+	.socket_sendmsg =		apparmor_socket_sendmsg,
-+	.socket_recvmsg =		apparmor_socket_recvmsg,
-+	.socket_getsockname =		apparmor_socket_getsockname,
-+	.socket_getpeername =		apparmor_socket_getpeername,
-+	.socket_getsockopt =		apparmor_socket_getsockopt,
-+	.socket_setsockopt =		apparmor_socket_setsockopt,
-+	.socket_shutdown =		apparmor_socket_shutdown,
-+
- 	.cred_alloc_blank =		apparmor_cred_alloc_blank,
- 	.cred_free =			apparmor_cred_free,
- 	.cred_prepare =			apparmor_cred_prepare,
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..084232b
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ */
-+
-+#include "include/apparmor.h"
-+#include "include/audit.h"
-+#include "include/context.h"
-+#include "include/net.h"
-+#include "include/policy.h"
-+
-+#include "net_names.h"
-+
-+struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_network[] = {
-+	AA_FS_FILE_STRING("af_mask", AA_FS_AF_MASK),
-+	{ }
-+};
-+
-+/* audit callback for net specific fields */
-+static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
-+{
-+	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
-+
-+	audit_log_format(ab, " family=");
-+	if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]) {
-+		audit_log_string(ab, address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]);
-+	} else {
-+		audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->u.net->family);
-+	}
-+	audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=");
-+	if (sock_type_names[sa->aad->net.type]) {
-+		audit_log_string(ab, sock_type_names[sa->aad->net.type]);
-+	} else {
-+		audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->aad->net.type);
-+	}
-+	audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", sa->aad->net.protocol);
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * audit_net - audit network access
-+ * @profile: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
-+ * @op: operation being checked
-+ * @family: network family
-+ * @type:   network type
-+ * @protocol: network protocol
-+ * @sk: socket auditing is being applied to
-+ * @error: error code for failure else 0
-+ *
-+ * Returns: %0 or sa->error else other errorcode on failure
-+ */
-+static int audit_net(struct aa_profile *profile, int op, u16 family, int type,
-+		     int protocol, struct sock *sk, int error)
-+{
-+	int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
-+	struct common_audit_data sa;
-+	struct apparmor_audit_data aad = { };
-+	struct lsm_network_audit net = { };
-+	if (sk) {
-+		COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NET);
-+	} else {
-+		COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
-+	}
-+	/* todo fill in socket addr info */
-+	sa.aad = &aad;
-+	sa.u.net = &net;
-+	sa.aad->op = op,
-+	sa.u.net->family = family;
-+	sa.u.net->sk = sk;
-+	sa.aad->net.type = type;
-+	sa.aad->net.protocol = protocol;
-+	sa.aad->error = error;
-+
-+	if (likely(!sa.aad->error)) {
-+		u16 audit_mask = profile->net.audit[sa.u.net->family];
-+		if (likely((AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) &&
-+			   !(1 << sa.aad->net.type & audit_mask)))
-+			return 0;
-+		audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
-+	} else {
-+		u16 quiet_mask = profile->net.quiet[sa.u.net->family];
-+		u16 kill_mask = 0;
-+		u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad->net.type) & ~quiet_mask;
-+
-+		if (denied & kill_mask)
-+			audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
-+
-+		if ((denied & quiet_mask) &&
-+		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
-+		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
-+			return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : sa.aad->error;
-+	}
-+
-+	return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, GFP_KERNEL, &sa, audit_cb);
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_net_perm - very course network access check
-+ * @op: operation being checked
-+ * @profile: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
-+ * @family: network family
-+ * @type:   network type
-+ * @protocol: network protocol
-+ *
-+ * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
-+ */
-+int aa_net_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family, int type,
-+		int protocol, struct sock *sk)
-+{
-+	u16 family_mask;
-+	int error;
-+
-+	if ((family < 0) || (family >= AF_MAX))
-+		return -EINVAL;
-+
-+	if ((type < 0) || (type >= SOCK_MAX))
-+		return -EINVAL;
-+
-+	/* unix domain and netlink sockets are handled by ipc */
-+	if (family == AF_UNIX || family == AF_NETLINK)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	family_mask = profile->net.allow[family];
-+
-+	error = (family_mask & (1 << type)) ? 0 : -EACCES;
-+
-+	return audit_net(profile, op, family, type, protocol, sk, error);
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_revalidate_sk - Revalidate access to a sock
-+ * @op: operation being checked
-+ * @sk: sock being revalidated  (NOT NULL)
-+ *
-+ * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
-+ */
-+int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk)
-+{
-+	struct aa_profile *profile;
-+	int error = 0;
-+
-+	/* aa_revalidate_sk should not be called from interrupt context
-+	 * don't mediate these calls as they are not task related
-+	 */
-+	if (in_interrupt())
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	profile = __aa_current_profile();
-+	if (!unconfined(profile))
-+		error = aa_net_perm(op, profile, sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
-+				    sk->sk_protocol, sk);
-+
-+	return error;
-+}
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
-index f1f7506..b8100a7 100644
---- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
-@@ -745,6 +745,7 @@ static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
- 
- 	aa_free_file_rules(&profile->file);
- 	aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps);
-+	aa_free_net_rules(&profile->net);
- 	aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits);
- 
- 	aa_free_sid(profile->sid);
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
-index deab7c7..8f8e9c1 100644
---- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
-@@ -193,6 +193,19 @@ fail:
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-+static bool unpack_u16(struct aa_ext *e, u16 *data, const char *name)
-+{
-+	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U16, name)) {
-+		if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u16)))
-+			return 0;
-+		if (data)
-+			*data = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u16 *) e->pos));
-+		e->pos += sizeof(u16);
-+		return 1;
-+	}
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
- static bool unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name)
- {
- 	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U32, name)) {
-@@ -471,6 +484,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
- {
- 	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
- 	const char *name = NULL;
-+	size_t size = 0;
- 	int i, error = -EPROTO;
- 	kernel_cap_t tmpcap;
- 	u32 tmp;
-@@ -564,6 +578,38 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
- 	if (!unpack_rlimits(e, profile))
- 		goto fail;
- 
-+	size = unpack_array(e, "net_allowed_af");
-+	if (size) {
-+
-+		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
-+			/* discard extraneous rules that this kernel will
-+			 * never request
-+			 */
-+			if (i >= AF_MAX) {
-+				u16 tmp;
-+				if (!unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
-+				    !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
-+				    !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL))
-+					goto fail;
-+				continue;
-+			}
-+			if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.allow[i], NULL))
-+				goto fail;
-+			if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.audit[i], NULL))
-+				goto fail;
-+			if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.quiet[i], NULL))
-+				goto fail;
-+		}
-+		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
-+			goto fail;
-+	}
-+	/*
-+	 * allow unix domain and netlink sockets they are handled
-+	 * by IPC
-+	 */
-+	profile->net.allow[AF_UNIX] = 0xffff;
-+	profile->net.allow[AF_NETLINK] = 0xffff;
-+
- 	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) {
- 		/* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */
- 		profile->policy.dfa = unpack_dfa(e);
--- 
-1.7.9.5
-
diff --git a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/apparmor-patches/3.4/0003-UBUNTU-SAUCE-apparmor-Add-the-ability-to-mediate-mou.patch b/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/apparmor-patches/3.4/0003-UBUNTU-SAUCE-apparmor-Add-the-ability-to-mediate-mou.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 48b34343e0b..00000000000
--- a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/apparmor-patches/3.4/0003-UBUNTU-SAUCE-apparmor-Add-the-ability-to-mediate-mou.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,957 +0,0 @@
-From a94d5e11c0484af59e5feebf144cc48c186892ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
-Date: Wed, 16 May 2012 10:58:05 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH 3/3] UBUNTU: SAUCE: apparmor: Add the ability to mediate
- mount
-
-Add the ability for apparmor to do mediation of mount operations. Mount
-rules require an updated apparmor_parser (2.8 series) for policy compilation.
-
-The basic form of the rules are.
-
-  [audit] [deny] mount [conds]* [device] [ -> [conds] path],
-  [audit] [deny] remount [conds]* [path],
-  [audit] [deny] umount [conds]* [path],
-  [audit] [deny] pivotroot [oldroot=<value>] <path>
-
-  remount is just a short cut for mount options=remount
-
-  where [conds] can be
-    fstype=<expr>
-    options=<expr>
-
-Example mount commands
-  mount,		# allow all mounts, but not umount or pivotroot
-
-  mount fstype=procfs,  # allow mounting procfs anywhere
-
-  mount options=(bind, ro) /foo -> /bar,  # readonly bind mount
-
-  mount /dev/sda -> /mnt,
-
-  mount /dev/sd** -> /mnt/**,
-
-  mount fstype=overlayfs options=(rw,upperdir=/tmp/upper/,lowerdir=/) -> /mnt/
-
-  umount,
-
-  umount /m*,
-
-See the apparmor userspace for full documentation
-
-Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
-Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
----
- security/apparmor/Makefile           |    2 +-
- security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c       |   13 +
- security/apparmor/audit.c            |    4 +
- security/apparmor/domain.c           |    2 +-
- security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h |    3 +-
- security/apparmor/include/audit.h    |   11 +
- security/apparmor/include/domain.h   |    2 +
- security/apparmor/include/mount.h    |   54 +++
- security/apparmor/lsm.c              |   59 ++++
- security/apparmor/mount.c            |  620 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 10 files changed, 767 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
- create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/mount.h
- create mode 100644 security/apparmor/mount.c
-
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
-index 19daa85..63e0a4c 100644
---- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
-+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
-@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
- 
- apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
-               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
--              resource.o sid.o file.o net.o
-+              resource.o sid.o file.o net.o mount.o
- 
- clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
- 
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
-index c66315d..ff19009 100644
---- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
-@@ -424,10 +424,23 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_domain[] = {
- 	{ }
- };
- 
-+static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_mount[] = {
-+	AA_FS_FILE_STRING("mask", "mount umount"),
-+	{ }
-+};
-+
-+static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_namespaces[] = {
-+	AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("profile",           1),
-+	AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("pivot_root",        1),
-+	{ }
-+};
-+
- static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
- 	AA_FS_DIR("domain",			aa_fs_entry_domain),
- 	AA_FS_DIR("file",			aa_fs_entry_file),
- 	AA_FS_DIR("network",                    aa_fs_entry_network),
-+	AA_FS_DIR("mount",                      aa_fs_entry_mount),
-+	AA_FS_DIR("namespaces",                 aa_fs_entry_namespaces),
- 	AA_FS_FILE_U64("capability",		VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
- 	AA_FS_DIR("rlimit",			aa_fs_entry_rlimit),
- 	{ }
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
-index cc3520d..b9f5ee9 100644
---- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
-@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ const char *const op_table[] = {
- 	"file_mmap",
- 	"file_mprotect",
- 
-+	"pivotroot",
-+	"mount",
-+	"umount",
-+
- 	"create",
- 	"post_create",
- 	"bind",
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
-index 6327685..dfdc47b 100644
---- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
-@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name)
-  *
-  * Returns: refcounted profile, or NULL on failure (MAYBE NULL)
-  */
--static struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex)
-+struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex)
- {
- 	struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
- 	struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns;
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
-index 40aedd9..e243d96 100644
---- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
-+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
-@@ -29,8 +29,9 @@
- #define AA_CLASS_NET		4
- #define AA_CLASS_RLIMITS	5
- #define AA_CLASS_DOMAIN		6
-+#define AA_CLASS_MOUNT		7
- 
--#define AA_CLASS_LAST		AA_CLASS_DOMAIN
-+#define AA_CLASS_LAST		AA_CLASS_MOUNT
- 
- /* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */
- extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
-index c1ff09c..7b90900c 100644
---- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
-+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
-@@ -73,6 +73,10 @@ enum aa_ops {
- 	OP_FMMAP,
- 	OP_FMPROT,
- 
-+	OP_PIVOTROOT,
-+	OP_MOUNT,
-+	OP_UMOUNT,
-+
- 	OP_CREATE,
- 	OP_POST_CREATE,
- 	OP_BIND,
-@@ -121,6 +125,13 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
- 			unsigned long max;
- 		} rlim;
- 		struct {
-+			const char *src_name;
-+			const char *type;
-+			const char *trans;
-+			const char *data;
-+			unsigned long flags;
-+		} mnt;
-+		struct {
- 			const char *target;
- 			u32 request;
- 			u32 denied;
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
-index de04464..a3f70c5 100644
---- a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
-+++ b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
-@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ struct aa_domain {
- 	char **table;
- };
- 
-+struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex);
-+
- int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
- int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
- void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/mount.h b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..bc17a53
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
-@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor file mediation function definitions.
-+ *
-+ * Copyright 2012 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef __AA_MOUNT_H
-+#define __AA_MOUNT_H
-+
-+#include <linux/fs.h>
-+#include <linux/path.h>
-+
-+#include "domain.h"
-+#include "policy.h"
-+
-+/* mount perms */
-+#define AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT	0x01
-+#define AA_MAY_MOUNT		0x02
-+#define AA_MAY_UMOUNT		0x04
-+#define AA_AUDIT_DATA		0x40
-+#define AA_CONT_MATCH		0x40
-+
-+#define AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK (MS_KERNMOUNT | MS_NOSEC | MS_ACTIVE | MS_BORN)
-+
-+int aa_remount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
-+	       unsigned long flags, void *data);
-+
-+int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
-+		  const char *old_name, unsigned long flags);
-+
-+
-+int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
-+			 unsigned long flags);
-+
-+int aa_move_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
-+		  const char *old_name);
-+
-+int aa_new_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *dev_name,
-+		 struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
-+		 void *data);
-+
-+int aa_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags);
-+
-+int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *old_path,
-+		  struct path *new_path);
-+
-+#endif /* __AA_MOUNT_H */
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
-index 3cde194..4512cc6 100644
---- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
-+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
-@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
- #include "include/path.h"
- #include "include/policy.h"
- #include "include/procattr.h"
-+#include "include/mount.h"
- 
- /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
- int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
-@@ -512,6 +513,60 @@ static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
- 			   !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
- }
- 
-+static int apparmor_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path, char *type,
-+			     unsigned long flags, void *data)
-+{
-+	struct aa_profile *profile;
-+	int error = 0;
-+
-+	/* Discard magic */
-+	if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
-+		flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK;
-+
-+	flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK;
-+
-+	profile = __aa_current_profile();
-+	if (!unconfined(profile)) {
-+		if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
-+			error = aa_remount(profile, path, flags, data);
-+		else if (flags & MS_BIND)
-+			error = aa_bind_mount(profile, path, dev_name, flags);
-+		else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
-+				  MS_UNBINDABLE))
-+			error = aa_mount_change_type(profile, path, flags);
-+		else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
-+			error = aa_move_mount(profile, path, dev_name);
-+		else
-+			error = aa_new_mount(profile, dev_name, path, type,
-+					     flags, data);
-+	}
-+	return error;
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
-+{
-+	struct aa_profile *profile;
-+	int error = 0;
-+
-+	profile = __aa_current_profile();
-+	if (!unconfined(profile))
-+		error = aa_umount(profile, mnt, flags);
-+
-+	return error;
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
-+{
-+	struct aa_profile *profile;
-+	int error = 0;
-+
-+	profile = __aa_current_profile();
-+	if (!unconfined(profile))
-+		error = aa_pivotroot(profile, old_path, new_path);
-+
-+	return error;
-+}
-+
- static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
- 				char **value)
- {
-@@ -729,6 +784,10 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
- 	.capget =			apparmor_capget,
- 	.capable =			apparmor_capable,
- 
-+	.sb_mount =			apparmor_sb_mount,
-+	.sb_umount =			apparmor_sb_umount,
-+	.sb_pivotroot =			apparmor_sb_pivotroot,
-+
- 	.path_link =			apparmor_path_link,
- 	.path_unlink =			apparmor_path_unlink,
- 	.path_symlink =			apparmor_path_symlink,
-diff --git a/security/apparmor/mount.c b/security/apparmor/mount.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..63d8493
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,620 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor mediation of files
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ */
-+
-+#include <linux/fs.h>
-+#include <linux/mount.h>
-+#include <linux/namei.h>
-+
-+#include "include/apparmor.h"
-+#include "include/audit.h"
-+#include "include/context.h"
-+#include "include/domain.h"
-+#include "include/file.h"
-+#include "include/match.h"
-+#include "include/mount.h"
-+#include "include/path.h"
-+#include "include/policy.h"
-+
-+
-+static void audit_mnt_flags(struct audit_buffer *ab, unsigned long flags)
-+{
-+	if (flags & MS_RDONLY)
-+		audit_log_format(ab, "ro");
-+	else
-+		audit_log_format(ab, "rw");
-+	if (flags & MS_NOSUID)
-+		audit_log_format(ab, ", nosuid");
-+	if (flags & MS_NODEV)
-+		audit_log_format(ab, ", nodev");
-+	if (flags & MS_NOEXEC)
-+		audit_log_format(ab, ", noexec");
-+	if (flags & MS_SYNCHRONOUS)
-+		audit_log_format(ab, ", sync");
-+	if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
-+		audit_log_format(ab, ", remount");
-+	if (flags & MS_MANDLOCK)
-+		audit_log_format(ab, ", mand");
-+	if (flags & MS_DIRSYNC)
-+		audit_log_format(ab, ", dirsync");
-+	if (flags & MS_NOATIME)
-+		audit_log_format(ab, ", noatime");
-+	if (flags & MS_NODIRATIME)
-+		audit_log_format(ab, ", nodiratime");
-+	if (flags & MS_BIND)
-+		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rbind" : ", bind");
-+	if (flags & MS_MOVE)
-+		audit_log_format(ab, ", move");
-+	if (flags & MS_SILENT)
-+		audit_log_format(ab, ", silent");
-+	if (flags & MS_POSIXACL)
-+		audit_log_format(ab, ", acl");
-+	if (flags & MS_UNBINDABLE)
-+		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", runbindable" :
-+				 ", unbindable");
-+	if (flags & MS_PRIVATE)
-+		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rprivate" :
-+				 ", private");
-+	if (flags & MS_SLAVE)
-+		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rslave" :
-+				 ", slave");
-+	if (flags & MS_SHARED)
-+		audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rshared" :
-+				 ", shared");
-+	if (flags & MS_RELATIME)
-+		audit_log_format(ab, ", relatime");
-+	if (flags & MS_I_VERSION)
-+		audit_log_format(ab, ", iversion");
-+	if (flags & MS_STRICTATIME)
-+		audit_log_format(ab, ", strictatime");
-+	if (flags & MS_NOUSER)
-+		audit_log_format(ab, ", nouser");
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * audit_cb - call back for mount specific audit fields
-+ * @ab: audit_buffer  (NOT NULL)
-+ * @va: audit struct to audit values of  (NOT NULL)
-+ */
-+static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
-+{
-+	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
-+
-+	if (sa->aad->mnt.type) {
-+		audit_log_format(ab, " fstype=");
-+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.type);
-+	}
-+	if (sa->aad->mnt.src_name) {
-+		audit_log_format(ab, " srcname=");
-+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.src_name);
-+	}
-+	if (sa->aad->mnt.trans) {
-+		audit_log_format(ab, " trans=");
-+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.trans);
-+	}
-+	if (sa->aad->mnt.flags || sa->aad->op == OP_MOUNT) {
-+		audit_log_format(ab, " flags=\"");
-+		audit_mnt_flags(ab, sa->aad->mnt.flags);
-+		audit_log_format(ab, "\"");
-+	}
-+	if (sa->aad->mnt.data) {
-+		audit_log_format(ab, " options=");
-+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.data);
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * audit_mount - handle the auditing of mount operations
-+ * @profile: the profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
-+ * @gfp: allocation flags
-+ * @op: operation being mediated (NOT NULL)
-+ * @name: name of object being mediated (MAYBE NULL)
-+ * @src_name: src_name of object being mediated (MAYBE_NULL)
-+ * @type: type of filesystem (MAYBE_NULL)
-+ * @trans: name of trans (MAYBE NULL)
-+ * @flags: filesystem idependent mount flags
-+ * @data: filesystem mount flags
-+ * @request: permissions requested
-+ * @perms: the permissions computed for the request (NOT NULL)
-+ * @info: extra information message (MAYBE NULL)
-+ * @error: 0 if operation allowed else failure error code
-+ *
-+ * Returns: %0 or error on failure
-+ */
-+static int audit_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp, int op,
-+		       const char *name, const char *src_name,
-+		       const char *type, const char *trans,
-+		       unsigned long flags, const void *data, u32 request,
-+		       struct file_perms *perms, const char *info, int error)
-+{
-+	int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
-+	struct common_audit_data sa;
-+	struct apparmor_audit_data aad = { };
-+
-+	if (likely(!error)) {
-+		u32 mask = perms->audit;
-+
-+		if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL))
-+			mask = 0xffff;
-+
-+		/* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
-+		request &= mask;
-+
-+		if (likely(!request))
-+			return 0;
-+		audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
-+	} else {
-+		/* only report permissions that were denied */
-+		request = request & ~perms->allow;
-+
-+		if (request & perms->kill)
-+			audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
-+
-+		/* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */
-+		if ((request & perms->quiet) &&
-+		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
-+		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
-+			request &= ~perms->quiet;
-+
-+		if (!request)
-+			return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ?
-+				complain_error(error) : error;
-+	}
-+
-+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
-+	sa.aad = &aad;
-+	sa.aad->op = op;
-+	sa.aad->name = name;
-+	sa.aad->mnt.src_name = src_name;
-+	sa.aad->mnt.type = type;
-+	sa.aad->mnt.trans = trans;
-+	sa.aad->mnt.flags = flags;
-+	if (data && (perms->audit & AA_AUDIT_DATA))
-+		sa.aad->mnt.data = data;
-+	sa.aad->info = info;
-+	sa.aad->error = error;
-+
-+	return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, gfp, &sa, audit_cb);
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * match_mnt_flags - Do an ordered match on mount flags
-+ * @dfa: dfa to match against
-+ * @state: state to start in
-+ * @flags: mount flags to match against
-+ *
-+ * Mount flags are encoded as an ordered match. This is done instead of
-+ * checking against a simple bitmask, to allow for logical operations
-+ * on the flags.
-+ *
-+ * Returns: next state after flags match
-+ */
-+static unsigned int match_mnt_flags(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
-+				    unsigned long flags)
-+{
-+	unsigned int i;
-+
-+	for (i = 0; i <= 31 ; ++i) {
-+		if ((1 << i) & flags)
-+			state = aa_dfa_next(dfa, state, i + 1);
-+	}
-+
-+	return state;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * compute_mnt_perms - compute mount permission associated with @state
-+ * @dfa: dfa to match against (NOT NULL)
-+ * @state: state match finished in
-+ *
-+ * Returns: mount permissions
-+ */
-+static struct file_perms compute_mnt_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa,
-+					   unsigned int state)
-+{
-+	struct file_perms perms;
-+
-+	perms.kill = 0;
-+	perms.allow = dfa_user_allow(dfa, state);
-+	perms.audit = dfa_user_audit(dfa, state);
-+	perms.quiet = dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state);
-+	perms.xindex = dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state);
-+
-+	return perms;
-+}
-+
-+static const char const *mnt_info_table[] = {
-+	"match succeeded",
-+	"failed mntpnt match",
-+	"failed srcname match",
-+	"failed type match",
-+	"failed flags match",
-+	"failed data match"
-+};
-+
-+/*
-+ * Returns 0 on success else element that match failed in, this is the
-+ * index into the mnt_info_table above
-+ */
-+static int do_match_mnt(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
-+			const char *mntpnt, const char *devname,
-+			const char *type, unsigned long flags,
-+			void *data, bool binary, struct file_perms *perms)
-+{
-+	unsigned int state;
-+
-+	state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, start, mntpnt);
-+	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
-+	if (!state)
-+		return 1;
-+
-+	if (devname)
-+		state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, devname);
-+	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
-+	if (!state)
-+		return 2;
-+
-+	if (type)
-+		state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, type);
-+	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
-+	if (!state)
-+		return 3;
-+
-+	state = match_mnt_flags(dfa, state, flags);
-+	if (!state)
-+		return 4;
-+	*perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state);
-+	if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	/* only match data if not binary and the DFA flags data is expected */
-+	if (data && !binary && (perms->allow & AA_CONT_MATCH)) {
-+		state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
-+		if (!state)
-+			return 4;
-+
-+		state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, data);
-+		if (!state)
-+			return 5;
-+		*perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state);
-+		if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT)
-+			return 0;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* failed at end of flags match */
-+	return 4;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * match_mnt - handle path matching for mount
-+ * @profile: the confining profile
-+ * @mntpnt: string for the mntpnt (NOT NULL)
-+ * @devname: string for the devname/src_name (MAYBE NULL)
-+ * @type: string for the dev type (MAYBE NULL)
-+ * @flags: mount flags to match
-+ * @data: fs mount data (MAYBE NULL)
-+ * @binary: whether @data is binary
-+ * @perms: Returns: permission found by the match
-+ * @info: Returns: infomation string about the match for logging
-+ *
-+ * Returns: 0 on success else error
-+ */
-+static int match_mnt(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *mntpnt,
-+		     const char *devname, const char *type,
-+		     unsigned long flags, void *data, bool binary,
-+		     struct file_perms *perms, const char **info)
-+{
-+	int pos;
-+
-+	if (!profile->policy.dfa)
-+		return -EACCES;
-+
-+	pos = do_match_mnt(profile->policy.dfa,
-+			   profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
-+			   mntpnt, devname, type, flags, data, binary, perms);
-+	if (pos) {
-+		*info = mnt_info_table[pos];
-+		return -EACCES;
-+	}
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static int path_flags(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path)
-+{
-+	return profile->path_flags |
-+		S_ISDIR(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode) ? PATH_IS_DIR : 0;
-+}
-+
-+int aa_remount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
-+	       unsigned long flags, void *data)
-+{
-+	struct file_perms perms = { };
-+	const char *name, *info = NULL;
-+	char *buffer = NULL;
-+	int binary, error;
-+
-+	binary = path->dentry->d_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA;
-+
-+	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
-+			     &info);
-+	if (error)
-+		goto audit;
-+
-+	error = match_mnt(profile, name, NULL, NULL, flags, data, binary,
-+			  &perms, &info);
-+
-+audit:
-+	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
-+			    NULL, flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
-+			    error);
-+	kfree(buffer);
-+
-+	return error;
-+}
-+
-+int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
-+		  const char *dev_name, unsigned long flags)
-+{
-+	struct file_perms perms = { };
-+	char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL;
-+	const char *name, *old_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
-+	struct path old_path;
-+	int error;
-+
-+	if (!dev_name || !*dev_name)
-+		return -EINVAL;
-+
-+	flags &= MS_REC | MS_BIND;
-+
-+	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
-+			     &info);
-+	if (error)
-+		goto audit;
-+
-+	error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT, &old_path);
-+	if (error)
-+		goto audit;
-+
-+	error = aa_path_name(&old_path, path_flags(profile, &old_path),
-+			     &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
-+	path_put(&old_path);
-+	if (error)
-+		goto audit;
-+
-+	error = match_mnt(profile, name, old_name, NULL, flags, NULL, 0,
-+			  &perms, &info);
-+
-+audit:
-+	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, old_name,
-+			    NULL, NULL, flags, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms,
-+			    info, error);
-+	kfree(buffer);
-+	kfree(old_buffer);
-+
-+	return error;
-+}
-+
-+int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
-+			 unsigned long flags)
-+{
-+	struct file_perms perms = { };
-+	char *buffer = NULL;
-+	const char *name, *info = NULL;
-+	int error;
-+
-+	/* These are the flags allowed by do_change_type() */
-+	flags &= (MS_REC | MS_SILENT | MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
-+		  MS_UNBINDABLE);
-+
-+	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
-+			     &info);
-+	if (error)
-+		goto audit;
-+
-+	error = match_mnt(profile, name, NULL, NULL, flags, NULL, 0, &perms,
-+			  &info);
-+
-+audit:
-+	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
-+			    NULL, flags, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
-+			    error);
-+	kfree(buffer);
-+
-+	return error;
-+}
-+
-+int aa_move_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
-+		  const char *orig_name)
-+{
-+	struct file_perms perms = { };
-+	char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL;
-+	const char *name, *old_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
-+	struct path old_path;
-+	int error;
-+
-+	if (!orig_name || !*orig_name)
-+		return -EINVAL;
-+
-+	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
-+			     &info);
-+	if (error)
-+		goto audit;
-+
-+	error = kern_path(orig_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &old_path);
-+	if (error)
-+		goto audit;
-+
-+	error = aa_path_name(&old_path, path_flags(profile, &old_path),
-+			     &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
-+	path_put(&old_path);
-+	if (error)
-+		goto audit;
-+
-+	error = match_mnt(profile, name, old_name, NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, 0,
-+			  &perms, &info);
-+
-+audit:
-+	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, old_name,
-+			    NULL, NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms,
-+			    info, error);
-+	kfree(buffer);
-+	kfree(old_buffer);
-+
-+	return error;
-+}
-+
-+int aa_new_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *orig_dev_name,
-+		 struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
-+		 void *data)
-+{
-+	struct file_perms perms = { };
-+	char *buffer = NULL, *dev_buffer = NULL;
-+	const char *name = NULL, *dev_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
-+	int binary = 1;
-+	int error;
-+
-+	dev_name = orig_dev_name;
-+	if (type) {
-+		int requires_dev;
-+		struct file_system_type *fstype = get_fs_type(type);
-+		if (!fstype)
-+			return -ENODEV;
-+
-+		binary = fstype->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA;
-+		requires_dev = fstype->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV;
-+		put_filesystem(fstype);
-+
-+		if (requires_dev) {
-+			struct path dev_path;
-+
-+			if (!dev_name || !*dev_name) {
-+				error = -ENOENT;
-+				goto out;
-+			}
-+
-+			error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &dev_path);
-+			if (error)
-+				goto audit;
-+
-+			error = aa_path_name(&dev_path,
-+					     path_flags(profile, &dev_path),
-+					     &dev_buffer, &dev_name, &info);
-+			path_put(&dev_path);
-+			if (error)
-+				goto audit;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
-+			     &info);
-+	if (error)
-+		goto audit;
-+
-+	error = match_mnt(profile, name, dev_name, type, flags, data, binary,
-+			  &perms, &info);
-+
-+audit:
-+	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name,  dev_name,
-+			    type, NULL, flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
-+			    error);
-+	kfree(buffer);
-+	kfree(dev_buffer);
-+
-+out:
-+	return error;
-+
-+}
-+
-+int aa_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
-+{
-+	struct file_perms perms = { };
-+	char *buffer = NULL;
-+	const char *name, *info = NULL;
-+	int error;
-+
-+	struct path path = { mnt, mnt->mnt_root };
-+	error = aa_path_name(&path, path_flags(profile, &path), &buffer, &name,
-+			     &info);
-+	if (error)
-+		goto audit;
-+
-+	if (!error && profile->policy.dfa) {
-+		unsigned int state;
-+		state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa,
-+				     profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
-+				     name);
-+		perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state);
-+	}
-+
-+	if (AA_MAY_UMOUNT & ~perms.allow)
-+		error = -EACCES;
-+
-+audit:
-+	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_UMOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
-+			    NULL, 0, NULL, AA_MAY_UMOUNT, &perms, info, error);
-+	kfree(buffer);
-+
-+	return error;
-+}
-+
-+int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *old_path,
-+		  struct path *new_path)
-+{
-+	struct file_perms perms = { };
-+	struct aa_profile *target = NULL;
-+	char *old_buffer = NULL, *new_buffer = NULL;
-+	const char *old_name, *new_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
-+	int error;
-+
-+	error = aa_path_name(old_path, path_flags(profile, old_path),
-+			     &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
-+	if (error)
-+		goto audit;
-+
-+	error = aa_path_name(new_path, path_flags(profile, new_path),
-+			     &new_buffer, &new_name, &info);
-+	if (error)
-+		goto audit;
-+
-+	if (profile->policy.dfa) {
-+		unsigned int state;
-+		state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa,
-+				     profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
-+				     new_name);
-+		state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->policy.dfa, state);
-+		state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state, old_name);
-+		perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state);
-+	}
-+
-+	if (AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT & perms.allow) {
-+		if ((perms.xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK) == AA_X_TABLE) {
-+			target = x_table_lookup(profile, perms.xindex);
-+			if (!target)
-+				error = -ENOENT;
-+			else
-+				error = aa_replace_current_profile(target);
-+		}
-+	} else
-+		error = -EACCES;
-+
-+audit:
-+	error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_PIVOTROOT, new_name,
-+			    old_name, NULL, target ? target->base.name : NULL,
-+			    0, NULL,  AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT, &perms, info, error);
-+	aa_put_profile(target);
-+	kfree(old_buffer);
-+	kfree(new_buffer);
-+
-+	return error;
-+}
--- 
-1.7.9.5
-
diff --git a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/libselinux/fPIC.patch b/pkgs/os-specific/linux/libselinux/fPIC.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index fdc1fa41a33..00000000000
--- a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/libselinux/fPIC.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/src/Makefile b/src/Makefile
-index ac019df..00432b9 100644
---- a/src/Makefile
-+++ b/src/Makefile
-@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ $(AUDIT2WHYSO): $(AUDIT2WHYLOBJ)
- 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -shared -o $@ $^ -L. -lselinux $(LIBDIR)/libsepol.a -L$(LIBDIR)
- 
- %.o:  %.c policy.h
--	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(TLSFLAGS) -c -o $@ $<
-+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(TLSFLAGS) -fPIC -c -o $@ $<
- 
- %.lo:  %.c policy.h
- 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -fPIC -DSHARED -c -o $@ $<
diff --git a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/udisks/cve-2014-0004.patch b/pkgs/os-specific/linux/udisks/cve-2014-0004.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ce907507538..00000000000
--- a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/udisks/cve-2014-0004.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
-commit ebf61ed8471a45cf8bce7231de00cb1bbc140708
-Author: Martin Pitt <martin.pitt@ubuntu.com>
-Date:   Wed Mar 5 14:07:44 2014 +0100
-
-    Fix buffer overflow in mount path parsing
-    
-    In the mount monitor we parse mount points from /proc/self/mountinfo.  Ensure
-    that we don't overflow the buffers on platforms where mount paths could be
-    longer than PATH_MAX (unknown if that can actually happen), as at least the
-    mount paths for hotpluggable devices are somewhat user-controlled.
-    
-    Thanks to Florian Weimer for discovering this bug, and to David Zeuthen
-    for his initial patch!
-    
-    CVE-2014-0004
-
-Index: udisks-1.0.4/src/mount-monitor.c
-===================================================================
---- udisks-1.0.4.orig/src/mount-monitor.c	2011-08-25 20:27:33.000000000 +0200
-+++ udisks-1.0.4/src/mount-monitor.c	2014-03-10 13:38:18.309406561 +0100
-@@ -39,6 +39,11 @@
- #include "mount.h"
- #include "private.h"
- 
-+/* build a %Ns format string macro with N == PATH_MAX */
-+#define xstr(s) str(s)
-+#define str(s) #s
-+#define PATH_MAX_FMT "%" xstr(PATH_MAX) "s"
-+
- /*--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
- 
- enum
-@@ -320,8 +325,8 @@ mount_monitor_ensure (MountMonitor *moni
-       guint mount_id;
-       guint parent_id;
-       guint major, minor;
--      gchar encoded_root[PATH_MAX];
--      gchar encoded_mount_point[PATH_MAX];
-+      gchar encoded_root[PATH_MAX + 1];
-+      gchar encoded_mount_point[PATH_MAX + 1];
-       gchar *mount_point;
-       dev_t dev;
- 
-@@ -329,7 +334,7 @@ mount_monitor_ensure (MountMonitor *moni
-         continue;
- 
-       if (sscanf (lines[n],
--                  "%d %d %d:%d %s %s",
-+                  "%d %d %d:%d " PATH_MAX_FMT " " PATH_MAX_FMT,
-                   &mount_id,
-                   &parent_id,
-                   &major,
-@@ -340,6 +345,8 @@ mount_monitor_ensure (MountMonitor *moni
-           g_warning ("Error parsing line '%s'", lines[n]);
-           continue;
-         }
-+      encoded_root[sizeof encoded_root - 1] = '\0';
-+      encoded_mount_point[sizeof encoded_mount_point - 1] = '\0';
- 
-       /* ignore mounts where only a subtree of a filesystem is mounted */
-       if (g_strcmp0 (encoded_root, "/") != 0)
-@@ -358,15 +365,17 @@ mount_monitor_ensure (MountMonitor *moni
-           sep = strstr (lines[n], " - ");
-           if (sep != NULL)
-             {
--              gchar fstype[PATH_MAX];
--              gchar mount_source[PATH_MAX];
-+              gchar fstype[PATH_MAX + 1];
-+              gchar mount_source[PATH_MAX + 1];
-               struct stat statbuf;
- 
--              if (sscanf (sep + 3, "%s %s", fstype, mount_source) != 2)
-+              if (sscanf (sep + 3, PATH_MAX_FMT " " PATH_MAX_FMT, fstype, mount_source) != 2)
-                 {
-                   g_warning ("Error parsing things past - for '%s'", lines[n]);
-                   continue;
-                 }
-+              fstype[sizeof fstype - 1] = '\0';
-+              mount_source[sizeof mount_source - 1] = '\0';
- 
-               if (g_strcmp0 (fstype, "btrfs") != 0)
-                 continue;
diff --git a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/wpa_supplicant/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch b/pkgs/os-specific/linux/wpa_supplicant/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index de1964ca769..00000000000
--- a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/wpa_supplicant/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-From 9ed4eee345f85e3025c33c6e20aa25696e341ccd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
-Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2015 11:32:11 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] P2P: Validate SSID element length before copying it
- (CVE-2015-1863)
-
-This fixes a possible memcpy overflow for P2P dev->oper_ssid in
-p2p_add_device(). The length provided by the peer device (0..255 bytes)
-was used without proper bounds checking and that could have resulted in
-arbitrary data of up to 223 bytes being written beyond the end of the
-dev->oper_ssid[] array (of which about 150 bytes would be beyond the
-heap allocation) when processing a corrupted management frame for P2P
-peer discovery purposes.
-
-This could result in corrupted state in heap, unexpected program
-behavior due to corrupted P2P peer device information, denial of service
-due to process crash, exposure of memory contents during GO Negotiation,
-and potentially arbitrary code execution.
-
-Thanks to Google security team for reporting this issue and smart
-hardware research group of Alibaba security team for discovering it.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
----
- src/p2p/p2p.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/p2p/p2p.c b/src/p2p/p2p.c
-index f584fae..a45fe73 100644
---- a/src/p2p/p2p.c
-+++ b/src/p2p/p2p.c
-@@ -778,6 +778,7 @@ int p2p_add_device(struct p2p_data *p2p, const u8 *addr, int freq,
- 	if (os_memcmp(addr, p2p_dev_addr, ETH_ALEN) != 0)
- 		os_memcpy(dev->interface_addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
- 	if (msg.ssid &&
-+	    msg.ssid[1] <= sizeof(dev->oper_ssid) &&
- 	    (msg.ssid[1] != P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN ||
- 	     os_memcmp(msg.ssid + 2, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN)
- 	     != 0)) {
--- 
-1.9.1
-